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## INFORMATION REPORT

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1. Chinese-trained North Korean officers and officials who speak fluent Chinese have been placed in various command channels of the North Korean Army and government under the pretense of effecting fluid coordination of operations with the Chinese Communist forces. High-ranking North Korean officers and officials include: Lieutenant General KIM Mu-chong, Chief of Artillery and Chief of Staff for Supply, Combined General Headquarters; PAK Il-u, Minister of Internal Affairs and Deputy Chief of Staff, Combined General Headquarters; and KIM Chang-man, Chief of Staff, North Korean Army General Headquarters. In early September there was no definite evidence that the Chinese-trained North Korean Communists were planning to take over the North Korean government. However, all pro-Chinese Communist North Korean officers have received promotions rapidly, on the recommendation of the Chinese Communists, including the three mentioned above, and 75 percent of the North Korean officers in command of units above battalion size are Chinese Communist-trained.
2. PAK Il-u is still playing both sides and is highly regarded and well-liked by both the Chinese Communist generals and KIM Il-song, although PAK maintains a safehouse for the anti-KIM Il-song faction. PAK is maintaining a hold over the hot-headed young officers who compose the Central Guard Brigade, KIM's own personal body guard, who are aware of the anti-KIM Il-song group. The Central Guard Brigade wishes to eliminate the group threatening KIM Il-song, and only PAK can hold them in check.
3. At a special meeting on 13 September high-ranking Chinese Communist and North Korean Communists discussed the party line in the North Korean Army. The North Koreans claimed that there was increasing discord between Korean officers and North Korean political commissars since the entrance of the Chinese Communists into the Korean war. The North Korean party line has been completely ignored by Chinese Communist officers in front-line sectors, creating a gap between the army and the political commissars. At the beginning of the war, KIM Il-song's clique did not realize the extent of the infiltration of Chinese Communists into the North Korean Army. Large numbers of pro-Chinese Communist officers now hold high-ranking positions and the North Korean clique is beginning to work to counteract this influence. In the 3 September meeting the Chinese Communists won; it was agreed that the North Korean political commissars were to be

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subordinate to Chinese Communist political commissars on an equal echelon.

4. The reason for the Chinese victory at the meeting was the Chinese claim that North Korea was near collapse and unable to meet Communist requirements. The North Koreans reluctantly agreed for the following reasons:

- a. There are too many desertions from the North Korean Army. Even among troops being transported to the rear, large numbers of defections are reported.
- b. There is no equipment available for the North Koreans, and the Chinese Communists are furnishing very little because of infrequent pressure by the Soviets.
- c. The Chinese Communists were obviously paving the way for a negotiated peace by frequently describing their troubles on the mainland and expressing a desire to return home where they are needed.
- d. The morale of the North Korean civilians is at the lowest ebb with the coming of winter. The people would welcome a Chinese Communist and North Korean defeat. Prior to 15 August, six riots occurred in P'yongyang and the neighboring towns of Chinnampo, Taepyong, and Chinji-dong. Even after the riots were quelled, the rioters were openly hostile to the commands of the police.

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